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1 Introduction
In Delaney and Thijssen [2], the concept of a disclosure option is proposed,
which is a real option available to a firm to voluntarily disclose information
to the market. The option to disclose, or withhold, information is a strategic
decision on the part of the firm, implying that the manager will only announce
the information if he is sufficiently certain that the market response will have
a positive impact on the firm’s value. Therefore, a firm with an opportunity
to make a disclosure is holding an option which is analogous to a financial
option. When the manager discloses some private information to the investors,
he exercises his option to disclose. By doing so, he gives up the possibility of
waiting for newer information to arrive that might affect the desirability of
the firm’s stock, and hence, have a greater positive impact on its profitability.
Hence, the option to wait has value.
However, firms may not always have the option to delay or withhold its
information disclosure. There can be occasions which make it imperative for
a firm to disclose quickly, such as in the face of competition. They must then
try to preempt disclosure by competitors, which could have a negative impact
on their own profit, relative to the profit of a competing firm. Hence, there
is a non-exclusivity feature inherent in a real option which is not associated
with its financial counterpart. If, on the other hand, delay is feasible, the
risk of disclosure by competing firms, is a cost to delay. The manager of the
firm must weigh this cost against the benefit(s) of waiting for new information
when deciding on what his optimal disclosure strategy ought to be. In such a
setting, one must conduct a game-theoretic analysis of equilibrium disclosure
strategies. In this paper I extend the analysis outlined in Delaney and Thijssen
[2] to estimate the impact of competition on the timing of corporate voluntary
disclosure.
This research primarily touches on two streams of literature; the litera-
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ture that deals with voluntary disclosure and the literature that addresses the
non-exclusivity feature inherent in a real option, in particular, the issue of
imperfect competition. While corporate voluntary disclosure has become an
important and topical area of research in recent years, particularly in the ac-
counting literature (see Verrecchia [12] for a detailed discussion), there have
been very few real option applications concerned with voluntary disclosure and
none, as far as I am aware, concerning competitive interactions between firms
in determining equilibrium exercise policies from a real options perspective.
Therefore, such an analysis provides an interesting and useful contribution to
the literature.
In terms of the competitive aspect of voluntary disclosure, the literature
deals with the dilemma with regard to information sharing between firms. Ac-
cording to Bettis [1], “much of the information that would make cash-flow
more forecastable for the shareholder is the same information that is com-
petitively valuable. Typical examples include detailed discussions of strategy,
new product characteristics, market share objectives, new process innovations
and plant costs and capacities”. Furthermore, “the information that investors
need to forecast future cash-flow with less uncertainty is the same information
a competitor may be able to use to thwart the realisation of this cash-flow.
Thus, information disclosure becomes a trade-off with investors and competi-
tors working at cross purposes”.
Models in which competitive issues give rise to a preference for withholding
disclosures include Gal-Or [6], Li [7], and Spulber [9]. A key finding in these
studies is that the particular form of competition (Bertrand versus Cournot)
can have a substantial influence on the firm’s ex ante preference for disclosure.
Dye and Sridhar [4] show that competitive pressures can lead to an increase
in disclosures. Roughly stated, if as competitor discloses information, a firm
feels pressured to do the same so as to affirm to investors that it too has
information worthy of disclosure.
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In terms of real option applications concerned with competitive equilibrium
in exercise policies, the literature is relatively scant. Furthermore, the applica-
tion of game theory to continuous-time models is not very well developed, and
can be quite difficult to implement. However, from the literature that does
exist, the generalisation of the real option approach to include competitive
equilibrium exercise strategies appears to provide very different implications
from the standard monopoly setting. For example, one of the most well known
results in the real options literature is the invalidation of the classical NPV
rule of investment. However, the inclusion of competitive access to an invest-
ment opportunity leads to a rapid erosion in the value of the option to wait,
making the standard NPV rule a much more accurate description of the actual
investment threshold.
This typical result is shown clearly in a basic example provided by Dixit
and Pindyck [3]. The example they present is based on Smets [8] and es-
sentially it demonstrates the tradeoff between the value of waiting and the
fear of preemption by a rival which suggests the need to invest sooner. The
parameters of the model determine which of these considerations holds most
weight.
This paper most closely resembles Thijssen et al. [11] from the perspective
of real options analysis. However, the crucial difference, in terms of technicali-
ties, is that they assume that the value of an unprofitable outcome from option
exercise is always zero, while this paper does not make such an assumption
and allows for a negative impact from option exercise. By not relaxing the
negative impact assumption, the current paper makes a noteworthy contribu-
tion in that it shows how a new equilibrium emerges whereby preemption is
nonsensical. This so-called “synergistic” equilibrium implies that the optimal
strategies of a firm is to never announce, or else to do so only at the same time
as its competitor; that is, simultaneous disclosure.
In this paper I consider two firms whose managers each have the opportu-
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nity to disclose to the market some private information about the profitability
of a product, or technology, in which each firm has invested. Information sig-
nals indicating the strength of the product’s profitability are obtained by the
managers at random points in time. Hence, disclosing the signals will impact
positively or negatively on the value of their respective firms. It is assumed
that prior to disclosure, the market is unaware that the firm has invested in
the product. Thus, signal disclosure is analogous to disclosing that they have
made an investment in the product.
In Delaney and Thijssen [2], a threshold is derived on the probability of a
positive shareholder response, above which the manager will opt to make an
announcement and otherwise withhold the information from the market. The
problem is solved as an optimal stopping problem by examining a number of
scenarios whereby the manager has the option to disclose some set of signals
to the market. The current paper uses this threshold as a benchmark to
examine how the influence of competition (in a duopoly framework) impacts
on the disclosure timing decision of a firm. A preemption, attrition, or synergy
equilibrium is found, depending on the trade-off between first and second mover
advantages and, also on the advantage from simultaneous disclosure.
This paper is arranged as follows; the set-up of the model is described in
the next section, while Section 3 outlines some of the equilibrium concepts
for timing games that have been developed by Fudenberg and Tirole [5] and
outlined further in Thijssen et al. [11]. Section 4 solves for the equilibria of
the game. Section 5 provides a numerical example to help better explain the
theoretical results. Section 6 finally concludes.
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2 Model
2.1 Background and Motivation
Consider two firms, both of which have invested in a new product or technol-
ogy, and the problem for the manager of each firm is to determine at what
point to disclose this information to the market, whilst taking into account
the other firm’s potential strategy. I assume that the product is still in the
developmental stage and signals regarding the progress of the development,
which are indicative of the potential profitability of the product for the firm,
are obtained by both managers at random points in time. The uncertainty
primarily arises from the managers’ being unsure how the market will respond
to such an announcement. The more positive the signals they obtain, the more
likely the market will interpret the information favourably. Hence, each time
a signal is obtained, the managers update their beliefs as to the likely market
response, in a Bayesian way. It is important to assume that each firm can
choose to abandon their investment at any point, before they launch product.
Thus, by choosing not to make an announcement, if the firm then abandons the
investment, the market may never learn that such an investment took place.
This implies another option for the managers; namely a divestment option.
However, taking account of the value of such an option is beyond the scope of
this paper.
I assume that both firms compensate their managers via stock options, and
hence, for each manager, the activities of their firm impacts upon their own
utility from wealth. Their objectives are, then, to maximise the discounted
expected current value of their respective firms.
In terms of the competitive aspect of the problem there are two possibilities;
either a Stackelberg competition arises or both firms disclose simultaneously.
After disclosure has taken place by at least one firm, the other firm then
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knows how the market interprets the signals or, equivalently, they know the
market’s interpretation of such a firm’s prospects given that they have invested
in the product. Hence, in the case of Stackelberg competition, there is an
information spillover from the leader to the follower, which creates a second
mover advantage. The follower then decides immediately on whether to reveal
his involvement in the product. It is assumed that this does not take any time
(see Thijssen et al. [11]). If one firm discloses at a time τ ≥ 0, the follower will
either disclose at τ as well, or not at all. This case is distinguished from the
case of simultaneous competition where both firms also disclose simultaneously
at τ . However, at the time of disclosure both firms are uncertain as to how the
market will respond to the announcement; that is, there is no second mover
advantage.
As in Delaney and Thijssen [2], I further assume that all disclosures are
(ex post) verifiable; that is, a manager will not issue mis-leading information
in an attempt to alter the market’s perception of his firm’s prospects.
2.2 Model Set-Up
The managers both hold an option to voluntarily disclose their involvement in
the product, via the signals they obtain, to the market and they are uncertain
about how this information will be perceived. If the revelation is regarded
positively by the market, this will result in an increase in the value of the firm
by an amount V P or, if regarded negatively, a fall in the value by an amount
V N , when the announcement is made, such that V N < 0 < V P . V P and
V N are the infinitely discounted values resulting from making a disclosure,
discounted at a constant rate r ∈ (0, 1).
In the case that the market response is favourable, the leader’s payoff equals
V PL > 0, whereas if it is not favourable, the payoff is V
N
L < 0. If the response
is favourable, the follower will immediately disclose and obtain V PF > 0, but
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will not disclose if the response is unfavourable, so V NF = 0. Without loss
of generality, it is assumed V PL > V
P
F > 0. Hence there is a first mover
advantage if the disclosure results in a positive market response, and disclosure
is profitable for both firms. In other words, the positive payoff to the manager
who is first to disclose is greater than the positive payoff to the manager who
follows and discloses in response to the leader’s action.
If the market response is not positive, the payoff is V NL < 0 (or a first
mover disadvantage). If the response is unfavourable, the follower observes
this and benefits because he can make his disclosure decision under complete
information. This information spillover to the follower when the leader has
disclosed earns him a second mover advantage. To ascertain whether the leader
or the follower is in the better position the magnitudes of the first and second
mover advantages have to be compared. If both firms disclose simultaneously,
and the response is positive (negative), both receive V PM > 0 (V
N
M < 0), such
that V PF < V
P
M < V
P
L and V
N
L < V
N
M < 0.
1
When a firm has the option to disclose its involvement in the product to
the market, it is assumed that the manager has some ex ante belief about the
market reaction to the announcement being either positive or negative. The
prior probability of a positive reaction, and therefore, an increase in the firm’s
value is given by
P(V P ) = p0, (1)
and this is identical for both firms.
I further assume that at some random points in time, both firms obtain
imperfect signals, from various sources, indicating whether the profitability of
their investment product is positive or negative. A high quality signal occurs
with probability θ > 1
2
. The signals are observed by both firms simultaneously
as both have invested in the same product.
1Note that the payoffs are regarded as an infinite stream of earnings per share, piij ,
discounted at rate r > 0; i.e. V ij =
∫∞
0
e−rtpiji dt =
1
rpi
i
j , i = P,N and j = L,M,F .
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The signal arrivals are modelled via a Poisson process with parameter µ >
0; that is, the probability that the manager obtains a signal is µdt and 1−µdt
if no new signal is obtained.
It is assumed that both firms have an identical belief pt ∈ (0, 1) that the
market response will be positive at time t. Similar to Thijssen et al. [11], I
denote by pM the belief such that the ex ante expected payoff for the follower
equals the ex ante expected payoff of simultaneous disclosure; that is, pM is
such that F (pM) = M(pM). When pt ≥ pM , both firms will disclose simulta-
neously, before the market interpretation is known. On the other hand, if one
firm discloses when pt < pM , it is not optimal for the other firm to do so also
at time t.
If the leader discloses at a point where the belief in a positive response is
pt, the leader’s ex ante expected payoff can be written as
L(pt) =
 ptV PL + (1− pt)V NL if pt < pMptV PM + (1− pt)V NM if pt ≥ pM . (2)
The follower only discloses in the case of a positive market response. Hence,
the ex ante expected payoff for the follower, if the leader discloses when the
belief in a positive response is pt, is given by
F (pt) =
 ptV PF if pt < pMptV PM + (1− pt)V NM if pt ≥ pM . (3)
Finally, in the case of simultaneous disclosure at belief pt, each firm has an ex
ante expected payoff given by
M(pt) = ptV
P
M + (1− pt)V NM . (4)
The preemption belief, denoted pP , is defined as being the belief at which
the managers are indifferent between being the leader or the follower; that is,
L(pP ) = F (pP ). Equating equations (2) and (3) gives the preemption belief
pP =
V NL
V NL − V PL + V PF
(5)
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which is well defined for V NL < 0.
Furthermore, since F (pM) = M(pM),
pM =
V NM
V NM − V PM + V PF
, (6)
which is the belief threshold above which both firms find it optimal to disclose
simultaneously.
A graphical depiction of the situation is given by Figure 1 for a specific
numerical parameterisation defined in Section 5.
It must be noted that a knife-edge result on whether the preemption belief
threshold is below the threshold where both managers disclose simultaneously
is not possible to obtain. However, pP < pM for
V PL − V PF >
(
V PM − V PF
) V NL
V NM
. (7)
Indeed, if pP > pM preemption is nonsensical since a point above which both
firms try preempting each other cannot intuitively exist after both firms have
disclosed simultaneously. This point is particularly important because it is the
main technical difference between the equilibrium derived by Thijssen et al.
[11]. They assume that V Nj = 0 for j = L,M,F , and hence, they find that
it is always the case that pP < pM . However, in this paper, V
N
L and V
N
M are
assumed to be non-zero, and consequently the inequality pP < pM does not
always hold.
The intuition governing equation (7) is the following; the simultaneous
disclosure effect outweighs the information spillover; i.e. pP < pM , when the
magnitude of the first mover advantage, V PL − V PF , is greater than a multiple
V NL /V
N
M (> 1) of the cost to the follower from not making a simultaneous
disclosure with the leader, V PM − V PF .
To compute the managers’ belief that there will be a positive response
to the announcement, pt := p(st), one must apply Bayes’ rule because their
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beliefs as to the profitability of the product are updated each time a new signal
arrives. This is given by (cf. Thijssen et al. [10])
p(st) =
θst
θst + ζ(1− θ)st , (8)
where ζ = 1−p0
p0
denotes the unconditional odds of a negative shareholder
response and st the number of positive signals in excess of negative signals
obtained by the managers at time t.
Furthermore, from equation (8), a solution for s can be obtained and is
given by
st =
log
(
1−pt
pt
)
− log ζ
log
(
1−θ
θ
) . (9)
3 Equilibrium Concepts for Timing Games
In this section I outline a formalisation of strategy spaces and payoffs for
continuous-time games. This formalisation is developed in Fudenberg and
Tirole [5] and Thijssen et al. [11].
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)0≤t≤∞,P) be a filtered probability space such that F0 con-
tains all the P-null sets of F and the filtration (Ft)0≤t≤∞ is right-continuous.
It is assumed that the stochastic process (Yt)t≥0 captures all of the uncertainty
on the filtered probability space.
In the current paper, a player’s only decision is to choose a (single) time
to disclose information signals to the market. The starting point of the game
is t = 0. A strategy consists of both a distribution function and an inten-
sity function. All the definitions below are defined for each path (Yt(ω))t≥0,
resulting from ω ∈ Ω.
Definition 1. A simple strategy for player n ∈ {i, j} in the subgame starting
at t0 ∈ [0,∞) is given by a tuple of real-valued functions (Gt0n , αt0n ) : [t0,∞)×
Ω→ [0, 1]× [0, 1], such that for all ω ∈ Ω
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1. Gt0n (·, ω) is non-decreasing and right continuous with left limits;
2. αt0n (·, ω) is right continuous with left limits;
3. if α(·, ω) = 0 and t = inf{u ≥ t0|αt0n (u, ω) > 0}, then the right-derivative
of αt0n (u, ω) exists and is positive.
Denote the strategy set of simple strategies of player n in the subgame start-
ing at t0 by S
s
n(t0, ω). Furthermore, define the strategy space by S
s(t0, ω) =
Πn=i,jS
s
n(t0, ω) and denote the strategy at t ∈ [t0,∞) by st0(t, ω) = (Gt0n (t, ω),
αt0n (t, ω))n=i,j.
Simple strategies allow for several disclosure strategies. Gtn is interpreted
as the cumulative probability that one player has disclosed before, or at, time
t. Additionally, it allows for continuous disclosure strategies (used in war of
attrition models) and single jumps. αtn is a measure for the “intensity” of the
atoms in the interval [t, t+ dt]. This intensity function allows for coordination
between firms in cases where disclosure by one firm is optimal, but simultane-
ous disclosure is not. At such points in time, solely using distribution functions
Gi leads to inefficient outcomes. Therefore, we allow for a randomisation de-
vice which is provided by the intensity function. The intensity function is
included in the strategy space to replicate the discrete time results that are
lost by modelling in continuous time (see Fudenberg and Tirole [5] for a more
in-depth explanation). As soon as the intensity function is non-zero a game is
played where both managers disclose with probabilities αi and αj, respectively.
The game is repeated until at least one of the firms has disclosed. Playing the
game is assumed to take no time, so that the stochastic process Yt remains
constant during this repetition process. The third condition is imposed for
technical convenience.
The definition of simple strategies does not a priori exclude the possibility
that both firms choose an intensity function that turns out to be inconsistent
with Gtn. To see this, suppose that for some t ≥ 0 it holds that αi(t) = 0.5
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and αj = 0. Then firm i invests with probability 1 at time t (see P(i,¬j).
This should be reflected in the distribution function G; i.e., Gi(t) = 1. Any
other value for Gi(t) would be inconsistent with (αi(t), αj(t)). In equilibrium it
should naturally be the case that such inconsistencies do not occur. Therefore,
the notion of α-consistency is introduced.
Definition 2. A tuple of simple strategies ((Gt0n , α
t0
n ))n=i,j for the subgame
starting at t0 ≥ 0 is α-consistent if for all ω ∈ Ω and t ≥ t0,
αt0i (t, ω)− αt0i (t−, ω) 6= 0⇒ Gt0i (t, ω)−Gt0i (t−, ω) =(
1−Gt0i (t−, ω)
) αt0i (t, ω)
αt0i (t, ω) + α
t0
j (t, ω)− αt0i (t, ω)αt0j (t, ω)
.
(10)
Definition 2 requires that if for either firm there is a jump in the intensity
function, then the jump in the cumulative distribution function of both firms
should equal the probability that the firm discloses by playing the game de-
scribed above. Note that if αt0i (t, ω) − αt0i (t−, ω) 6= 0 and αt0i (t, ω) = 1, then
α-consistency implies that Gt0i (t, ω) = 1.
Let the payoff function for firm n ∈ {i, j} in the subgame starting at t0
be given by Vn : [0,∞) × Ss(t0, ω) → R. An α-equilibrium for the subgame
starting at t0 ≥ 0 is then defined as follows:
Definition 3. A tuple of simple strategies s∗ = (s∗(ω))ω∈Ω, s∗(ω) ∈ Ss(t0, ω),
for all ω ∈ Ω, is an α-equilibrium for the subgame starting at t0 if for all ω ∈ Ω,
s∗(ω) is α-consistent and
∀n∈{1,2}∀sn∈Ssn(t0,ω) : Vn(t0, s∗(ω)) ≥ Vn(t0, sn, s∗−n(ω)). (11)
A caveat with α-equilibrium is that it does not exclude time inconsistent
strategies. Hence, we need a family of strategies (Gtn(·, ω)), otherwise known
as a closed loop. This closed loop is necessary, because to test for perfect-
ness, strategies conditional on zero-probability events must be defined; in other
words it is needed to define a subgame perfect equilibrium. Furthermore, let for
all ω ∈ Ω and t0 ≥ 0, τ be defined as τ = minn=i,j{inf{t ≥ t0|αt0n (t, ω) > 0}}.
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Definition 4. A closed loop strategy for player n ∈ {i, j} is for all ω ∈ Ω a col-
lection of simple strategies (Gtn(·, ω), αtn(·, ω))0≤t<∞, with (Gtn(·, ω), αtn(·, ω)) ∈
Ssn(t, ω) for all t ≥ 0 that satisfies the following intertemporal consistency
condition for all ω ∈ Ω:
∀0≤t≤u≤v<∞ : v = inf{τ > t|Yτ = Yv} ⇒ Gtn(v, ω) = Gun(v, ω)
and
αtn(v, ω) = α
u
n(v, ω).
(12)
The set of closed loop strategies for player n ∈ {i, j} is denoted by Scln (ω).
As before, the strategy space is defined by Scl(ω) = Πn=i,jS
cl
n (ω).
A consistent α-equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 5. A tuple of closed loop strategies s¯ = (s¯(ω))ω∈Ω, s¯(ω) ∈ Scl(ω) all
ω ∈ Ω is a consistent α-equilibrium if for all t ∈ [0,∞), the corresponding tuple
of simple strategies
(
(Gti, α
t
i), (G
t
j, α
t
j)
)
is an α-equilibrium for the subgame
starting at t.
For the remainder of the analysis, let ω ∈ Ω be fixed. For notational
convenience, ω will be dropped as an argument.
4 Equilibria of the Game
Suppose, for now, that one firm, say firm i, has been preassigned the leader’s
role and firm j can only disclose once the leader has done so. In this case,
there exists a pt ∈ (0, pM) such that the ex ante expected payoff for the leader
is greater than the ex ante expected payoff from simultaneous disclosure; i.e.
L(pt) > M(pt). The intuition is that for such a belief, pt, the leader’s decision
has no effect on the optimal response of the follower. Thus, the leader acts as
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if there is no follower and becomes a monopolist. From Delaney and Thijssen
[2], it is optimal for the leader to disclose when pt hits the threshold
p∗L =
[
1− V
P
V N
Π
]−1
, (13)
where
Π =
(
β1(r + µ)− µθ(1− θ)
)(
r
µ
+ 1− θ
)
− µθ(1− θ)β1(
β1(r + µ)− µθ(1− θ)
)(
r
µ
+ θ
)
− µθ(1− θ)β1
(14)
and
β1 =
r + µ
2µ
+
1
2
√(
r
µ
+ 1
)2
− 4θ (1− θ) > θ. (15)
From equation (9), it is easy to verify that st is increasing in pt. Then sL :=
s(pL) > sP := s(pP ) when pL > pP . This is true for
V PL − V PF
V PL
> Π. (16)
The left-hand side (LHS) of equation (16) is the cost to the follower for waiting
to obtain the information spillover relative to the leader’s payoff. Comparative
statics show that this relative cost is increasing in V PL . The greater the payoff
to the leader, the more the follower “suffers” as a result of not having been the
first to disclose. Conversely, this cost is decreasing in V PF , which intuitively
makes sense.
Comparative statics show that the right-hand side (RHS) of equation (16)
is decreasing in signal quality, θ, and in signal quantity, µ. Intuitively, the
value of the information spillover to the follower is greater when the quality
and quantity of the information signals are low; that is for lower values of θ and
µ. Hence, if a manager becomes the disclosure leader, he provides relatively
more information to his competitor when the quality and quantity of signals
are low, and thus, for the RHS of (16) relatively high, compared with when the
RHS of (16) is low. This shows that (16) is essentially a relative comparison
between the first and second mover advantages.
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I further note that pP > p
L
NPV . This implies that preemption, in a real
options framework, still asserts later disclosure than the traditional net present
value (NPV) rule would suggest. However, it is not possible to obtain an
unambiguous relationship between pLNPV and pM ; that is, between the classical
NPV rule and the point at which firms will disclose simultaneously. This is
due to the fact that the condition pM > pP only holds for certain values of V
i
j
(i ∈ {P,N} and j ∈ {L,M,F}).
4.1 Preemption
If pL > pP , the leader advantage outweighs the information spillover. This
implies that the firm who first discloses that it has invested in this new product
will benefit, through an increase in outside investment, more than the firm who
waits to ascertain how the market will react to the information. This is because
the signals regarding the product’s development are sufficiently good that each
firm wants to be the first to disclose that it has undertaken this investment,
and thereby, attain a greater positive impact on its value than the impact it
would obtain from being the follower. The likely reaction to the firm that is
the follower, while it will be positive, will be more muted than the reaction
to the leader’s disclosure, simply because the revelation is less novel from the
follower. Additionally, in this instance, the signals are sufficiently strong that
neither firm feels the need to wait for their competitor to disclose its decision
to invest in the product so that they may observe the market’s reaction to this
information. This type of scenario will be covered in the following subsection.
For pP ≤ pt < pM , the optimal αtn(·) function is obtained through max-
imising firm i’s payoff in a competitive game such that if neither firm discloses,
the game is repeated, and can be repeated infinitely many times.
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I denote firm i’s payoff by Vi. Then
Vi(t0, si, sj) =αiαjM + αi(1− αj)L+ (1− αi)αjF + . . .
+ αiαj(1− αi)T−1(1− αj)T−1M
+ αi(1− αi)T−1(1− αj)TL
+ αj(1− αi)T (1− αj)T−1F
= (αiαjM + αi(1− αj)L+ αj(1− αi)F )×
T−1∑
t=0
[(1− αi)(1− αj)]t .
(17)
If dt is the size of one time period and if T∆ := Tdt, then T − 1 ≡ T∆dt − 1.
Hence, letting dt ↓ 0, the summation over t is from 0 to ∞, implying (17) is
the infinite sum of a geometric series with common ratio (1− αi)(1− αj) < 1.
Therefore
Vi =
αiαjM + αi(1− αj)L+ αj(1− αi)F
1− (1− αi)(1− αj) . (18)
Maximising this expression with respect to αi (and noting that only symmet-
rical strategies are considered) gives
αj =
L(pt)− F (pt)
L(pt)−M(pt)
=
pt
(
V PL − V PF
)
+ (1− pt)V NL
pt (V PL − V PM ) + (1− pt) (V NL − V NM )
=αi.
(19)
Let P(i,¬j|τ) denote the probability that firm i is the only firm that discloses
at time τ . By a similar limiting argument to that already outlined in equation
(17),
P(i,¬j|τ) = αi (1− αj)
αi + αj − αiαj . (20)
If P(i, j|τ) denotes the probability that both firms disclose simultaneously at
τ ,
P(i, j|τ) = αiαj
αi + αj − αiαj . (21)
To analyse the equilibrium outcome in the preemption game, I consider three
separate regions; (i) pt < pP , (ii) pP ≤ pt < pM , and (iii) pt ≥ pM .
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Region 1: If pt < pP , the payoff to the follower from disclosing at pt is
greater than the payoff to the leader; i.e. F (pt) > L(pt). Therefore, neither
firm wants to be the first to disclose and both will abstain from disclosing
until the excess number of positive over negative signals, sP , has been reached.
Intuitively, the excess number of positive signals is insufficient for the manager
to be confident of a positive market response to the revelation that they have
invested in such a product. Therefore, each firm would prefer to wait until
the other firm has disclosed so as to obtain the information spillover before
deciding whether to make an announcement or not.
In equilibrium there are two possible outcomes. In the first outcome, firm
i is the leader and discloses when the belief is pP and firm j is the follower and
discloses at pM . The second outcome is the symmetric counterpart.
Region 2: If pP ≤ pt < pM is the starting point of the game, both firms try
to preempt each other to obtain a first mover advantage since L(pt) > M(pt).
However pt < pM implies that the belief in a positive response is not strong
enough such that simultaneous disclosure is optimal.
If pt = pP , recall that F (pP ) = L(pP ), and thus, from equation (19),
αi = 0. The probability that i is the only firm that discloses is zero, from
(20). Similarly, the probability that both firms disclose simultaneously is zero,
from (21). However, firm j invests with probability one because P(¬i, j|τ) =
(1−αi)αj
αi+αj−αiαj = 1. Thus, the expected disclosure payoff for firm i is zero and for
firm j is P(¬i, j|τ)F (pP ) = F (pP ).
However, if pt > pP , L(pt) > F (pt) which implies αi(pt) > 0. The proba-
bility that firm i discloses at pt and firm j at pM is given by (20). Both firms
disclose simultaneously at pt with probability given by (21), leaving both with
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a low payoff M(pt)(< F (pt)). The expected payoff to each firm is then
P(i,¬j|τ)L(pt) + P(¬i, j|τ)F (pt) + P(i, j|τ)M(pt)
=
αiL+ αjF − αiαj(L+ F −M)
αi + αj − αiαj
=
F (F − 2M + L)
L− 2M + F ≡ F (pt),
(22)
by substituting for αi and αj using equation (19).
Region 3: If pt ≥ pM , M(pt) = F (pt). Therefore, both firms will disclose
simultaneously, each getting F (pt).
Therefore, the overall equilibrium strategy of firm n ∈ {i, j} for pL > pP is
as follows:
Gtn =

0 if pt < pP
pt(V PL −V PM )+(1−pt)(V NL −V NM )
pt(V PL −2V PM+V PF )+(1−pt)(V NL −2V NM )
if pP ≤ pt < pM
1 if pt ≥ pM ,
(23)
and
αtn =

0 if pt < pP
pt(V PL −V PF )+(1−pt)V NL
pt(V PL −V PM)+(1−pt)(V NL −V NM )
if pP ≤ pt < pM
1 if pt ≥ pM .
(24)
4.2 War of Attrition
On the other hand, if pP > pL the information spillover outweighs the leader
advantage. This implies that signals are less strong (in terms of content rather
than quality) than in the preemption case, and that both firms are less con-
vinced that the likely market reaction to the news that they have invested in
this new product will be positive. For example, if the shareholders learn of
the investment the manager has undertaken, they may regard such an invest-
ment as too risky a venture and that the sunk investment costs the firm may
have incurred are not likely to be recouped. Therefore, it is optimal for the
manager of each firm to wait until his competitor has disclosed so that they
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can make their own decision over whether to also disclose, or to wait for more
signals to arrive, under complete information. That is, he will only disclose if
he knows for sure that the market will respond positively to the information.
Both firms wish to be the follower so as to obtain the information spillover
and protect themselves against a negative response. Hence, a war of attrition
arises between the two firms.
For pt > pP , the game is exactly the same as the preemption game already
discussed. However, if the excess number of signals is such that pt ∈ [pL, pP ),
a war of attrition arises since both firms would prefer to be the follower. The
game ends once pP is reached. In a war of attrition, two asymmetric equilibria
arise trivially; either firm i discloses with probability one and firm j with
probability zero, or vice versa.
To find a symmetric equilibrium, I argue in line with Thijssen et al. [11]
that for each point in time during a war of attrition the expected payoff from
disclosing immediately exactly equals the payoff from waiting a small period
of time dt and disclosing when a new signal arrives. The probability that the
other firm discloses at belief pt is denoted by γ(st),
2 and following the analysis
outlined in Thijssen et al. [11], γ(·) is given by:
γ(st) =
1− γ(st)
F (st)−M(st)
[
L(st)− µ
r + µ
θst+1 + ζ(1− θ)st+1
θst + ζ(1− θ)st ×(
γ(st + 1)
(
M(st + 1)− L(st + 1)
)
+ L(st + 1)
)
+
µ
r + µ
θ(1− θ) (θst−1 + ζ(1− θ)st−1)
θst + ζ(1− θ)st ×(
γ(st − 1)
(
M(st − 1)− L(st − 1)
)
+ L(st − 1)
)]
.
(25)
To solve for γ(·), note that if pt < pL, neither firm will disclose, since the option
value of waiting is higher than the expected payoff from disclosing. Therefore
γ(sL) = 0. On the other hand, if pt > pP , the firms enter a preemption game.
2Of course, this is also the probability that the manager’s own firm has disclosed since
the equilibria are symmetric.
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It is also possible that pP = pM , and then the game proceeds directly from a
war of attrition into a game where simultaneous disclosure is optimal. Thus, for
other values of pt; that is, for pt ∈ [pL, pP ), it is necessary to solve a system of
equations where the pt-th entry is given by (25). A system such as this cannot
be solved analytically but for any specific set of parameter values a numerical
solution may be determined. Thijssen et al. [11] prove that a solution to a
system of equations given by (25) always exists, and furthermore, γ ∈ [0, 1].
Defining the time at which preemption occurs by T t0P := inf{t ≥ t0|pt ≥
pP}, and the number of signals that has arrived up until time t by kt :=
sup{k|T t0k ≤ t}, the symmetric (α-consistent) equilibrium is given by
Gtn =

0 if pt ≤ pL∑
k
γ(sk)
1−γ(sk)Π
k
k′=kt(1− γ(sk′)) if pL < pt < pP(
1−Gtn(T t0P −)
)
×
pt(V PL −V PM )+(1−pt)(V NL −V NM )
pt(V PL −2V PM+V PF )+(1−pt)(V NL −2V NM )
if pP ≤ pt < pM
1 if pt ≥ pM ,
(26)
and
αtn =

0 if pt < pP
pt(V PL −V PF )+(1−pt)V NL
pt(V PL −V PM)+(1−pt)(V NL −V NM )
if pP ≤ pt < pM
1 if pt ≥ pM .
(27)
The technicalities of this result are not new to this paper, and thus, the reader
is referred to Thijssen et al. [11] for further details.
4.3 Synergy
The condition given by equation (7) is necessary for pP < pM to be true.
However, if the values of V ij (i = P,N and j = L,M,F ) are such that this
condition does not hold, then intuitively, there cannot be a preemption point.
This produces a type of “synergistic effect” in that the simultaneous revelation
that both firms have invested in the product is expected to generate a stronger
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positive market response (and thus a higher payoff from disclosure) than stand-
alone disclosure by either firm at pP would generate.
This scenario occurs if the managers both believe that by disclosing with its
competitor that it has invested in this new product, the market will react more
favourably (or less negatively) than if the firm was to disclose as the leader.
In other words, if the market learns that two very similar firms have chosen
to undertake an investment in the same product, investors are more reassured
of the product’s potential success than if they believed only one such firm had
chosen to undertake the investment.
This new type of equilibrium that arises is driven by the assumption in my
paper that V Nj 6= 0 for j = {L,M}. If there was no direct negative impact on
the firms’ value through making a disclosure, then an attempt by the managers
to temper the extent to which the investors will sell off their firm’s stock would
not be an issue. If this was simply an investment problem whereby the sunk
costs incurred are the main loss to the firm, then it would be plausible to let
V Nj = 0, for all j. Indeed, this is the problem examined by Thijssen et al.
[11]. However, with respect to disclosure, if the investors do not like what they
learn, then they may sell their stock which lowers the firm’s value. If such
a negative response were to ensue under the condition that pP > pM , then
revelation that a similar firm has also chosen to invest in this new product will
serve to reassure the market of the product’s potential success, and thereby
temper the extent of the market sell-off. Conversely, if a positive response
were to ensue, simultaneous disclosure would boost the extent of the market’s
investment in the firms through a firmer confidence in the product’s success.
Technically, the inequality given by (7) is reversed when the first mover ad-
vantage is less than a multiple, V NL /V
N
M , of the difference between the positive
payoff from simultaneous disclosure and the positive payoff obtained by a firm
that is the follower. The situation occurs if the negative impact to the leader
from disclosing, V NL , is very strong relative to the negative impact obtained
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from disclosing simultaneously with the other firm, V NM . To see this more
clearly, if V NL → −∞, then the RHS of (7) becomes infinitely large, and the
condition pP < pM no longer holds. Similarly, if the negative payoff obtained
from simultaneous disclosure is not particularly low, that is, if V NM ↑ 0 then
once again, the RHS becomes infinitely large and the condition breaks down.
If the leader effect outweighs the synergy effect, pM < pL, neither firm will
disclose until pt ≥ pM is reached, and then both will disclose simultaneously
each getting the payoff F (pM). It is never optimal for one firm to disclose on
its own and information spillover has no value. This contrasts with the case
when pP < pM < pL. In this case, the market will learn sooner about the
investment since one of the firms will disclose once pP is reached. The other
firm then decides whether to reveal its involvement in the investment or not,
and hence, the ensuing market reaction to the two firms’ actions is likely to
have different impacts than if they were to only ever disclose together or not
at all.
Hence the equilibrium strategy is given by
Gtn =
 0 if pt < pM1 if pt ≥ pM , (28)
and
αtn =
 0 if pt < pM1 if pt ≥ pM . (29)
If the synergy effect outweighs the leader effect; i.e. pL < pM , a war of attri-
tion arises in the region [pL, pM) because both firms would prefer to wait and
disclose simultaneously rather than be the leader. The analysis is similar to
that which yields the equilibrium strategy given by equations (26) and (27),
23
so it suffices to state that the equilibrium strategy for this scenario is given by
Gtn =

0 if pt ≤ pL(
1−Gtn(T t0L −)
)
×
pt(V PL −V PM )+(1−pt)(V NL −V NM )
pt(V PL −2V PM+V PF )+(1−pt)(V NL −2V NM )
if pL < pt < pM
1 if pt ≥ pM ,
(30)
and
αtn =

0 if pt ≤ pL
pt(V PL −V PF )+(1−pt)V NL
pt(V PL −V PM)+(1−pt)(V NL −V NM )
if pL < pt < pM
1 if pt ≥ pM ,
(31)
where T t0L := inf{t ≥ t0|pt ≥ pL}.
A graphical depiction of this equilibrium, for a specific parameterisation
defined in Section 5, is given in Figure 2.
5 Numerical Example
My aim in this section is to provide an insight into the magnitude of some
of the effects which I discuss in previous sections. For the parameterisation
Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Parameter Value
V PL 20 p0 0.5
V NL −10 r 0.04
V PF 10 θ 0.6
V PM 12 µ 4
V NM −5
given in Table 1; sL = 6, sM = 4 and sP = 1. The corresponding belief
probabilities are pL ≈ 93%, pM ≈ 83% and pP ≈ 60%. Since sP < sM < sL
the leader advantage outweighs the information spillover. Both firms will try
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to preempt each other when they have one extra positive signal regarding the
product’s profitability, and if the excess of positive over negative signals is
four or more, it is optimal for both firms to disclose simultaneously, before the
market response is known. The probability of simultaneous disclosure can be
found using equations (24) and (21).
Figure 1 depicts this situation graphically. The leader’s payoff, L(pt), inter-
sects with the follower’s payoff, F (pt), at pP = 0.6. As shown, for all pt < 0.6,
the leader curve lies below the follower’s curve; i.e. L(pt) < F (pt) and nei-
ther firm wants to be the first to disclose. F (pt) intersects with the payoff
curve from simultaneous disclosure, M(pt), at pM ≈ 0.83, and for pt ≥ 0.83
it is clear that F (pt) = M(pt). However, for pt < pM , M(pt) lies below F (pt)
implying that the manager would prefer to wait and obtain the information
spillover from the leader rather than disclosing simultaneously before the mar-
ket response is known. The final intersection point is for L(pt) = M(pt) at
pt ≈ 0.38. However, since this plot depicts the situation whereby the leader
advantage outweighs the information spillover; i.e. pL > pP (recall pL ≈ 0.93),
no action will be taken by either firm for pt < 0.6. Hence, pt = 0.38 is not a
point that needs to be discussed.
Consider, however, if the parameterisation is such that V PL = 15 and V
N
L =
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pt
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Figure 1: Payoff functions.
−25. The condition (7) no longer holds; that is pM > pP , and a synergy equi-
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librium emerges. The situation is depicted graphically in Figure 2. The payoff
functions M(pt) and F (pt) intersect at pM ≈ 0.83. It appears from the figure
that L(pt) also intersects them at pM ≈ 0.83, but it actually lies slightly below
the intersection point at pM since F (pM) = M(pM) ≈ 4.17 and L(pM) ≈ 3.33.
For all values of pt ≤ pM , the leader’s payoff function lies below the follower’s
implying that the information spillover outweighs the leader advantage, and
thus, neither manager wants to be the first to disclose. Thus, for all pt ≤ pM ,
there is no point, pP , such that the leader and follower payoffs are equal. Sim-
ilarly, for all pt < pM , F (pt) > M(pt) implying that the information spillover
also outweighs the synergy effect, and thus, it is not optimal for either manager
to disclose simultaneously with his competitor. Hence, no disclosure will be
taken by either firm until pM is reached. Once pt ≥ pM , it is optimal for both
firms to disclose simultaneously, and the game ends.
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pt
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Figure 2: Synergistic equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I examine the impact of competition, in a duopoly framework, on
the voluntary disclosure policy of firms. Each firm is assumed to have invested
in a specific product and the manager of each firm must then decide when to
optimally disclose its involvement in the product to the market, while taking
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into consideration the disclosure strategy of the other firm. A preemption,
attrition, or synergy equilibrium is found, depending on the trade-off between
first and second mover advantages and, also on the advantage from disclosing
simultaneously with the competing firm.
I do not make the assumption that the negative impact of disclosure on firm
value is zero, and therefore, a new equilibrium emerges whereby preemption is
nonsensical. This so-called “synergistic” equilibrium implies that the optimal
strategy of a firm is to never announce, or else to do so only at the same
time as its competitor. The intuition behind this equilibrium result is that
the investors’ conviction that their firm has invested in a profitable venture is
strengthened by the fact that another similar firm has also chosen to undertake
the same investment. This will then temper any sell-off in shares, if the market
were to respond in a negative way to the information, than if only one firm
were to disclose, or conversely, amplify the effect of a positive market response.
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